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1Title: Strategic Use of Recycled Content Standards under International
Duopoly
Abstract: We examine the strategic use of recycled content standards (RCSs) under
international duopoly. RCSs require ﬁrms supplying the domestic market to use a certain
proportion of recycled materials as inputs. We demonstrate that, when there is no trade
in recycled materials, two identical countries both set strategically stricter or more lax
RCSs. However, when there is trade in recycled materials, it may be the case that one
country sets a stricter RCS while the other sets a more lax RCS. When a world supply
constraint on recycled materials is not binding, the main source of the asymmetric
distortion in RCSs is a demand eﬀect for recycled materials.
Keywords: recycling; recycled content standard; international trade; strategic trade
policy.
JEL classiﬁcation: F12; F13; F18.
21 Introduction
In recent years, many countries have experienced substantial increases in recycling,
partly because governments have implemented policies to encourage recycling. However,
since ﬁrms tend to be reluctant to use recycled materials, governments have recognized
the need for policy measures that stimulate demand for recycled materials. The im-
position of recycled content standards (RCSs) is such a policy. RCSs require that a
particular consumption good sold in the domestic market contains a certain percentage
of recycled material. For example, in the United States (US), 12 states and Washing-
ton DC enforce mandatory RCSs on newsprint as of 2004.1 The strictest standards are
adopted by California, Connecticut, and Missouri, which require newsprint to contain
at least 50% of recycled paper.
Green procurement requirements are also a similar policy tool. For example, in the
US, more than 40 states have State Paper Procurement Laws, which require a certain
percentage of paper purchased by state agencies to be recycled. In many cases, qualiﬁ-
cation standards for “recycled paper,” such as the requirement for at least 50% recycled
content, are also speciﬁed in these laws. Another example is the Law on Promoting
Green Purchasing, which became eﬀective in Japan in April 2001.2 This law requires
the public sector to buy products that contain a certain percentage of recycled materials
or recyclable products. A wide variety of products are covered by the Law, including
stationery, oﬃce furniture, oﬃce automation machines, home electronic appliances, and
1See the web site of American Forest & Paper Association (AF&PA) at http://www.afandpa.org/. Thirteen other
states have also implemented voluntary RCSs on newsprint. See also Laplante and Luckert [16].
2The formal name is the “Law Concerning the Promotion of Procurement of Eco-Friendly Goods and Services by the
State and Other Entities.” For details, see http://www.env.go.jp/en/lar/green/index.html (Ministry of the Environment).
3vehicles.3 Since public consumption expenditure accounts for at least 17% of GDP in
Japan, the eﬀect of the Law could be substantial.4
While RCSs and green procurements are primarily aimed at reducing domestic waste
by stimulating domestic demand for recycled materials, they may have some additional
eﬀects if consumption goods and/or recycled materials are internationally traded. In-
deed, the volume of recycled materials, including paper, aluminum, copper, and zinc,
which are internationally traded, is growing (van Beukering [21]).
For example, Canada produced 8.5 million tons of newsprint in 2002, 62% of which
was exported to the US. The share of Canadian producers in the US newsprint market
was 49% in 2002. At the same time, Canada used 5.1 million tons of recyclable paper in
2002, 33% of which was imported, mainly from the US. The US recovered 47.6 million
tons of paper and board from domestic sources in 2002, 24% of which was exported.5
Thus, RCSs on newsprint and State Paper Procurement Laws in the US aﬀect Canadian
ﬁrms as well as US ﬁrms. Canadian newsprint producers import recyclable paper from
the US in order to comply with RCSs in the US (Laplante and Luckert [16]).6
This paper investigates the choice of RCSs where there is trade in goods and recycled
3Example of the standards set by the Law are: (i) at least 10% recycled content from used polyethylene terephthalate
(PET) bottles must be used for carpets and curtains; and (ii) 100% recycled content must be used for printing paper.
4The share was calculated from 2003 data, using OECD national account statistics.
5The Canadian data on newsprint were obtained from the Forest Products Association of Canada and the data on
recyclable paper were taken from the Paper Recycling Association of Canada. The US data on the newsprint market
were obtained from FAOSTAT, the database provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), and the data on recyclable paper were from AF&PA.
6Japanese exports of recyclable paper and board are also increasing signiﬁcantly. In 2003, Japan exported 1.97 million
tons of used paper and board, 52% of which was exported to China. These data are taken from trade statistics provided
by the Customs and Tariﬀ Bureau, Ministry of Finance, Japan (http://www.customs.go.jp/index e.htm). As far as old
newspaper is concerned, 0.36 million tons were exported, which is almost 10 % of total newspaper consumption.
4materials. In particular, we are interested in the strategic aspects of RCSs. As already
mentioned, when goods and/or recycled materials are traded, governments may have an
incentive to use RCSs for reasons other than encouraging the domestic use of recycled
materials.7 We analyze the conditions under which RCSs are distorted, relative to the
RCSs that maximize global welfare.
The strategic use of environmental policy has been examined by, e.g., Barrett [1],
Kennedy [13], and Ulph [20]. Existing studies have examined how environmental policies,
such as emission taxes and standards, are distorted for strategic purpose when there is
trade. The strategic eﬀects identiﬁed in previous studies include a rent capture eﬀect and
a pollution shifting eﬀect. These eﬀects are typically observed when market structures
are imperfectly competitive. These strategic eﬀects motivate governments to distort
environmental policy, in relation to policies that fully internalize the externality.
Our study relates to the literature on strategic environmental policy. Unlike existing
studies, we examine the strategic aspects of policies that are designed to aﬀect con-
sumption stages; existing studies have mainly focused on policies aimed at aﬀecting
production stages.
Unlike existing studies, a demand eﬀect for recycled materials and a terms-of-trade
eﬀect are important in our analysis. The former eﬀect arises if, when trade in recycled
materials takes place, a country that exports recycled materials may be able to increase
not only the domestic ﬁrm’s demand but also the foreign ﬁrm’s demand for recycled
materials generated in its own country by changing its RCS. An importing country of
recycled materials, by contrast, may only increase its import demand for recycled mate-
7This analysis can also be applied to interstate (interprovincial, interprefectural) trade in recycled materials.
5rials by raising its RCS. Therefore, countries exporting and importing recycled materials
may experience asymmetric eﬀects on waste reduction, and accordingly, environmental
damage. The latter eﬀect, which is similar to the usual one under international trade,
stems from trade in recycled materials. That is, an increase in the international price of
recycled materials beneﬁts the county that exports recycled materials.
In this paper, we focus on the former eﬀect and brieﬂy discuss the latter eﬀect. We
do so for three main reasons. First, the purpose of setting RCSs is to encourage the
use of recycled materials. In other words, this type of policy is used to eliminate an
excess supply (surplus) of recycled materials. The demand eﬀect for recycled materials
is important in this case. In practice, some countries have often had surpluses of recy-
cled materials.8 Second, in the absence of artiﬁcial trade barriers, no trade in recycled
materials takes place only if supply constraints are not binding in either country. Thus,
a clear-cut comparison can be made between trade and absence of trade in recycled
materials when at least one country has an excess supply of recycled materials. Third,
other studies have analyzed the terms-of-trade eﬀect in a similar framework (e.g., Cass-
ing and Kuhn [2]). Moreover, while the terms-of-trade eﬀect is important in the context
of trade and the environment, it is not an eﬀect that is speciﬁc to environmental issues.
To analyze the eﬀect that is speciﬁc to this issue, we assume that the two countries are
identical except with respect to the supply of recycled materials. A number of factors,
such as market scale and capacity constraints, potentially make the supply of recycled
8For example, there was an excess supply of used paper throughout the 1990s in Japan and in the early 1990s in the
US. In the US, the success of recycling collection programs produced and excess supply, which led to RCSs on newsprint
(See Jacques et al. [12]). Moreover, the number of recovered PET bottles has always exceeded that of recycled PET
bottles (See the web site of the Japan Containers and Packaging Recycling Association at http://www.jcpra.or.jp/).
6materials diﬀer between countries. One is diﬀerences in recovery rates. Table 1 shows
recovery rates for aluminum beverage cans and paper in selected countries in 2002. The
table shows wide diversities in recovery rates for both materials. Similar diﬀerences
are observed for other materials. Since diﬀerences in recovery rates can generate trade
in recycled materials in a straightforward way, we incorporate these diﬀerences to our
analysis. We ﬁrst consider the case in which there is no trade in recycled materials and
then consider the one in which there is trade in recycled materials.
The main results are as follows. First, if governments set their RCSs non-
cooperatively, the RCSs may be stricter or more lax than is required to maximize global
welfare. This depends on the structure of demand, price diﬀerences between virgin and
recycled materials, and the shape of the environmental damage function. Second, while
the RCSs in the two countries are distorted in the same direction when there is no trade
in recycled materials, they may be distorted in opposite directions when there is trade
in recycled materials. That is, it may be the case that the country exporting recycled
materials imposes a stricter RCS and the importing country imposes a more lax RCS
than those that would be imposed under cooperation, or vice versa. A demand eﬀect for
recycled materials is a major source of asymmetric distortion in RCSs when the world
supply constraint for recycled materials is not binding.
There are few theoretical studies of recycling and trade. Examples include Di Vita
[3], van Beukering [21], and Huhtala and Samakovlis [9], none of which has examined
the strategic use of RCSs. Our study is also related to the literature on local content
requirements (LCRs) (e.g., Grossman [8], Krishna and Itoh [14], and Richardson [18]).
LCRs require ﬁrms to use a certain proportion of locally made intermediate inputs.
7RCSs diﬀer from LCRs because RCSs do not specify from where the required types
of intermediate inputs should be procured. Thus, ﬁndings relating to LCRs do not
necessarily apply to RCSs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 examines the conditions under which governments have incentives to use RCSs strate-
gically when there is no trade in recycled materials. Section 4 investigates the case in
which trade in recycled materials takes place. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
There are two countries that are identical in all respects except the supply of recycled
materials. The home country is denoted by h and the foreign country is denoted by f.
One ﬁrm is located in each country and produces a homogeneous good X. The inverse
demand function in each country is given by
pi = P[Xi], P
0 < 0, for i = h,f, (1)
where pi and Xi denote the consumer price and the total consumption of good X in
country i, respectively.9 Throughout this paper, square brackets apply to functions.
Each ﬁrm uses one unit of material to produce one unit of good X. Material can be
virgin, recycled, or a mixture of the two. Each country imports the virgin material from
the rest of the world. The world price of the virgin material is ﬁxed at wV.10
9We assume that the price of good X is independent of how much recycled material is included in good X. Allowing
price to depend on the proportion of recycled material included in the good is straightforward, and although this extension
increases the number of conditions required to derive our main results, those results are not greatly aﬀected.
10In reality, most virgin materials are exhaustible. However, since we are focusing on waste rather than on exhaustible
resources, for simplicity, we assume a constant price of virgin materials.
8The recycled material is only supplied within the two countries. One unit of recycled
material is produced from one unit of wasted good X.11 It is assumed that recycled
materials are supplied under perfect competition. The price of recycled material in
each country is denoted by wi
R, i = h,f. It is costly to recycle materials from waste
goods. We assume that a constant marginal cost of recycling, which is denoted by
cR(= ci
R,i = h,f). We also assume that transportation costs are zero. When a supply
constraint for recycled materials is not binding in country i, wi
R = ci
R holds. Moreover,
no trade in recycled materials takes place only if supply constraints are not binding in
either country.12 Thus, wh
R = w
f
R ≡ wR holds whether or not there is trade in recycled
materials. We also assume that wV < cR ≤ wR holds. Thus, unless it is compulsory to
use recycled materials, ﬁrms have no incentives to use them.
Let MC
j





i = µiwR + (1 − µi)wV, i,j = h,f, (2)
where µi ∈ [0,1] denotes the RCS set by country i. Since the general aim of RCSs is to
ensure that goods consumed in the domestic market contain a certain percentage of re-
cycled materials, the marginal costs diﬀer not in production country but in consumption
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11In practice, it is impossible to produce one unit of recycled material from one unit of a wasted good X in terms of
material balance. For example, producers must remove the ink from used paper to produce re-usable paper. However,
our results do not depend on this assumption, which is made only for simplicity.
12This is shown in Appendix B.
9Once consumed, units of good X are wasted. If they are not recycled, they are
disposed of in landﬁlls. Due to the depletion of landﬁll capacity or to externalities
generated by landﬁlls, wasted goods that are not recycled cause environmental damage.
Good X, which is wasted at time t − 1, is recycled to be used as recycled material
at time t. Thus, the supply of recycled material at time t cannot exceed λiXi,t−1,
where λi ∈ [0,1] denotes the recovery rate in country i. We focus on the steady-state
equilibrium, in which Xi,t−1 = Xi,t = Xi.13 The supply of recycled materials is λiXi in
each period. The demand for the recycled material in country i is given by µixi
i +µjxi
j.
Even if demand exceeds supply, (1 − λi)Xi cannot be recovered and this quantity is
disposed of in landﬁlls. Since we assume that recovered material is not preserved for
future periods, some proportion of λiXi is also disposed of if supply exceeds demand.14
Environmental damage experienced by citizens in country i is a function of the actu-
ally wasted goods in country i. When the supply constraint is not binding in country i,
environmental damage is given by the following:15




i[µh,µf]], i,j = h,f, i 6= j, (4)
13Given the RCSs of both countries, diﬀerences between demand and supply are quickly eliminated because prices for
recycled materials change daily. However, it usually takes time for recovery rates to change because this typically requires
the behavior of consumers and production and consumption systems to change. The time lag between primary production
and recycling may also aﬀect ﬁrms’ outputs and proﬁts (Gaudt and Long [7]). However, since our purpose is to examine
the strategic use of RCSs given the time lag in recycling, we focus on the steady state and ignore dynamic processes. In
fact, articles that examine policies related to recycling often focus on the steady state (e.g., Eichner and Pethig [5]).
14We do not consider transportation costs. In practice, it is costly to preserve recycled materials. Thus, from both
theoretical and practical points of view, ﬁrms have no incentives to preserve materials for future periods if world supply
exceeds world demand. Even if the price of recycled materials changes due to excess demand or supply, ﬁrms do not stock
recycled materials if it is costly to do so.
15We implicitly make the following two assumptions. First, recycling causes no environmental damage. Second, for
simplicity, environmental damage is measured in money terms.
10where D
j
i denotes the demand by ﬁrm j for the recycled materials generated in coun-
try i. We assume that E0
i > 0 and E00
i > 0.16 However, if the demand for recycled
materials generated in country i exceeds the supply of recycled materials in country i,
environmental damage is given by
Ei = Ei[(1 − λi)Xi], i = h,f. (5)
The government of country i sets its RCS to maximize social welfare, which is deﬁned
as the sum of consumers’ surplus (CS), the proﬁt of ﬁrm i, and the producers’ surplus
(PS) for the suppliers of recycled materials, minus the environmental damage suﬀered





P[y]dy − P[Xi]Xi + π
i + (wR − cR)λiXi − Ei, for i = h,f. (6)
Note that the PS for the suppliers of recycled materials is zero when wR = cR. Moreover,




The structure of the two-stage game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, both governments
simultaneously set their own RCSs. In the second stage, both ﬁrms simultaneously
determine their outputs. They compete in quantities in Cournot fashion. The solution
is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
16We exclude the possibility that E00
i = 0. Its inclusion would only add the case of RCSs being strategic neutral in
Lemma 1. This case is of no interest in the context of the strategic eﬀects of RCSs.
113 RCSs in the Absence of Trade in Recycled Materials
In this section, we examine the case where there is an excess supply of recycled materials
in each country. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that each ﬁrm procures recycled
materials from its own country, since it would pay additional costs to procure them from
abroad.17 Thus, there is no trade in recycled materials, and wR = cR in each country.18
Although we focus on the home RCS, the same results apply for the foreign RCS.
3.1 Eﬀects of RCSs
We ﬁrst examine the eﬀects of RCSs on CS, ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and environmental damage.









h − µhwR − (1 − µh)wV = 0, j = h,f (8)
where Pi = P[Xi] and P 0
i = P 0[Xi]. We obtain the equilibrium outputs for each speciﬁed
level of µh, which are denoted by ˆ xh
h[µh] and ˆ x
f
























































where Ωh = P
02
h (3 − h), in which h ≡ −XhP 00[Xh]/P 0[Xh] denotes the elasticity of
the slope of the inverse demand function. We assume that the second-order conditions
(SOCs) for stability hold: i.e., 2P 0
h + P 00
hxh
h < 0, 2P 0
h + P 00
hx
f
h < 0, and P
02
h (3 − h) > 0.19
17For example, a ﬁrm must pay an additional ﬁxed cost to collect information.
18See Appendix A for possible combinations of the two RCSs under which there is no trade in recycled materials.
19It is well known that  often plays a crucial role in the analysis of monopoly and oligopoly (Seade [19], Ishikawa and
Spencer [10], and Furusawa et al. [6]). When  is constant, the inverse demand function is P = a1X1−/( − 1) + a2 for
 6= 1, and is P = −b1 lnX + b2 for  = 1, where ai,bi > 0,i = 1,2. If the price elasticity is constant,  is also constant.
When  < 0 (resp.  = 0,  > 0), the inverse demand curve is concave (resp. linear, convex). In general, the demand









< 0, j = h,f. (9)
Since the outputs of both ﬁrms fall, the price of good X rises and home CS decreases.















· (wR − wV)ˆ x
j
h (10)
for i,j = h,f, i 6= j. It is clear that whether a change in µh increases or decreases
proﬁts depends on the demand structure. Since wR − wV > 0, if h < 2 (resp. h > 2),
proﬁts fall (resp. rise) when µh increases. In other words, if the demand curve is highly
convex, ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase as the RCS becomes stricter.
Next, consider environmental damage in the home country. Since D
j






































This follows because µh ∈ [0,1], E0
h > 0, and dˆ xh
h/dµh = dˆ x
f
h/dµh < 0. Thus, environ-
mental damage in the home country decreases as µh becomes stricter. The eﬀect of an
increase in µh on Eh can be decomposed into two eﬀects. First, since an increase in µh
reduces the output of both ﬁrms in the home country, the supply of wasted goods in the




in (11). Second, an increase in µh changes ﬁrm h’s demand for recycled materials, which
is represented by ˆ xh
h + µhdˆ xh
h/dµh in (11). Although the sign of the second eﬀect is
ambiguous, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second one, and hence Eh falls.
curve is highly convex when  > 2. Moreover, the SOCs imply h < 3 and hx
j






h/Xh = 1/2. Thus, if the former condition is satisﬁed, the latter condition is also satisﬁed. Consequently,
we can discuss the case in which h < 3.
13Now we consider environmental damage in the foreign country. Diﬀerentiating (4)


















h/dµh < 0 holds from (9), the sign of (12) is ambiguous. In this case, only the
eﬀect of an increase in µh that works through the demand for recycled materials arises.
As already discussed, this eﬀect may harm the foreign environment, and hence, Ef may
increase as µh becomes stricter. Whether a higher µh increases or decreases Ef depends
on the demand structure and the diﬀerence between wR and wV.
3.2 The Optimal Degree of RCSs
In this subsection, we investigate the optimal non-cooperative degree of RCSs and com-
pare them with the cooperative RCSs. “Non-cooperative” means that each government
chooses its RCS to maximize welfare in its own country, while “cooperative” means that
each government chooses its RCS to maximize world welfare.
We compare the non-cooperative RCSs with the cooperative RCSs for the following
reasons. In practice, given the increasing trend of trade in goods and recycled materials,
countries must cooperate to deal with the problem of waste, because it is an international
problem rather than a local problem. Theoretically, cooperative RCSs are eﬃcient but do
not represent the ﬁrst-best solution. However, if countries also agree on side payments,
the eﬃcient solution is an important factor of the ﬁrst-best solution. Moreover, by
decomposing the ineﬃciency into several eﬀects, we can investigate the strategic behavior
of the government. In fact, the cooperative solution is used as a common benchmark for
14evaluating environmental policies in open economies.20














We assume that the SOCs are satisﬁed.21 Since the outputs supplied to the foreign
market (ˆ xh
f and ˆ x
f






























From (11), (12), (14), and the symmetry of the two countries, we establish
Lemma 1 The RCSs are strategic complements (resp. substitutes) if and only if an
increase in µi raises (resp. reduces) the amount of waste generated in country j (i 6= j).
The intuition is straightforward. When an increase in µf increases waste in the home
country, the home country responds by raising µh to reduce the negative eﬀect of an
increase in µf on its environment. Thus, RCSs are strategic complements in this case.
When an increase in µf reduces waste in the home country, the home country responds
by reducing µh. This is because a reduction in domestic waste due to an increase in µf
enables the home country to make its RCS less strict without damaging its environment.
Thus, RCSs are strategic substitutes in this case.22
20See, for example, Kennedy [13] and Duval and Hamilton [4].




f − ∂2Wh/(∂µf∂µh) ·
∂2Wf/(∂µh∂µf) > 0,∂2W/∂µ2
h < 0,∂2W/∂µ2
f < 0,and ∂2W/∂µ2
h · ∂2W/∂µ2
f − (∂2W/(∂µf∂µh))2 > 0. If  is constant,
some conditions are obtained for the SOCs to be satisﬁed, and it is shown that the sign of ˆ xi
j +µjdˆ xi
j/dµj is not important
for the satisfaction of the SOCs. A proof is available from the corresponding author upon request.
22Note that since ˆ xi
j + µjdˆ xi
j/dµj < 0 does not hold globally (for example, ˆ xi
j + µjdˆ xi
j/dµj ≥ 0 at µj = 0), strategic
complementarity does not hold globally.
15Next, we compare the non-cooperative RCSs with those determined cooperatively.


























From (10), (12), (15), Lemma 1, and given the symmetry of countries, we obtain
Proposition 1 Suppose that both governments set their own RCSs simultaneously. If
the RCSs are strategic complements (resp. substitutes) and i ≤ 2 (resp. i ≥ 2) holds in
the neighborhood of the non-cooperative equilibrium, both RCSs are stricter (resp. more
lax) than the cooperative RCSs.
The intuition is as follows. When the home government maximizes its own country’s
welfare, it does not take into account the proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrm and the damage to
the environment of the foreign country. Thus, if an increase in the strictness of the home
RCS reduces the proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrm and increases environmental damage in the
foreign country, the home country’s non-cooperative RCS is stricter than the cooperative
RCS. The reverse may also apply, and hence, the home RCS may be more lax than the
cooperative RCS. In either case, the foreign country suﬀers from the distortion in the
optimal non-cooperative RCS in the home country. Note that Proposition 1 shows the
suﬃcient conditions required for this result. Hence, even if one of the two conditions is
not satisﬁed, the sign of (15) can be positive or negative.
In this case, since there is no trade in recycled materials, there is no demand for
recycled materials generated in country i by ﬁrm j. Thus, by the symmetry of the
countries, the eﬀect of a change in the RCS of country i on environmental damage in
country j is not asymmetric. Therefore, it is clear that in the SPNE, the home non-
16cooperative RCS is stricter (resp. more lax) than the cooperative RCS if and only if the
foreign non-cooperative RCS is stricter (resp. more lax) than the cooperative RCS.
Moreover, one point should be noted about the decomposition of the ineﬃciency.
Because of the symmetry of cost structure between the two ﬁrms, the home RCS aﬀects
both ﬁrms equally, which implies that their proﬁts change in the same direction. Thus,
unlike Kennedy [10], there is no “rent capture eﬀect” in our model, in which ﬁrm h’s
proﬁt increases at the expense of ﬁrm f’s. However, if the RCSs are strategic comple-
ments, an increase in µi leads to a decrease (resp. an increase) in environmental damage
in country i (resp. country j). This eﬀect is considered a pollution shifting eﬀect.
4 Trade in Recycled Materials
In this section, we determine the RCSs when there is trade in recycled materials be-
tween the two countries. When the world supply constraint for recycled materials is
not binding, the main eﬀect is a demand eﬀect for recycled materials. By contrast,
when the world supply constraint for recycled materials is binding, the main eﬀect is a
terms-of-trade eﬀect. We investigate these two cases separately.
4.1 World Supply Constraint for Recycled Materials is not Binding
We ﬁrst examine the case where the diﬀerence in the recovery rate is large and, accord-
ingly, there is an excess demand for recycled materials in only one country. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the recovery rate is higher in the home country (i.e.,
λh > λf) and that the supply constraint is binding in the foreign country.23
23Appendix A describes possible combinations of µh and µf. Appendix B shows conditions required for trade to occur.
17Since wR = cR in this case, the eﬀects of RCSs on ﬁrms’ outputs and proﬁts are the
same as those when there is no trade in recycled materials. On the other hand, the
eﬀects of RCSs on environmental damage are diﬀerent from the eﬀects in the absence
of trade and are asymmetric between the two countries. In this case, since the foreign
ﬁrm imports recycled materials from the home country, D
f




f −λf ˆ Xf 6= 0,
while Dh
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 < 0. (19)
An increase in µh has no eﬀect on environmental damage in the foreign country and an
increase in µf has an ambiguous eﬀect on environmental damage in the home country.
When the foreign government chooses its RCS non-cooperatively, the FOC for the





























 = 0. (20)
We assume that the SOCs hold.24 From (20), we obtain ∂2W f/∂µf∂µh = 0, which
implies that RCSs are strategic neutral for the foreign country. Diﬀerentiating world
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24The SOCs in this case are analogous to those in footnote 21, which apply when there is no trade in recycled materials,
with slight diﬀerences. Details are available from the corresponding author upon request.
18Since the sign of dπh/dµf is ambiguous and E
0
h > 0 and dˆ xh
f/dµf + dˆ x
f
f/dµf < 0 hold,
the sign of (21) is ambiguous. Thus, as in the case in which there is no trade in recycled
materials, the foreign RCS may be stricter or more lax than the cooperative RCS.















































we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the home country exports recycled materials. The RCSs are
strategic complements (resp. substitutes) for the home government if and only if an
increase in µf raises (resp. reduces) the amount of waste generated in the home country.
The lemma implies that the condition relating to the strategic relationship for the home
country is similar to that in the case in which there is no trade in recycled materials
(Lemma 1). Thus, when there is trade in recycled materials, the strategic relationship
for the home country and that for the foreign country could be asymmetric.














In this context, we use the fact that waste in the foreign country is given by (1−λf)Xf.
Since the sign of dπf/dµh is ambiguous, the home RCS may be stricter or more lax than
the cooperative RCS. However, unlike in the case of the home RCS when there is no
trade in recycled materials, only a change in the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts determines the
diﬀerence between the cooperative and the non-cooperative RCSs. This contrasts with
the determination of the foreign RCS in the context of (21).
19The Nash equilibrium in the ﬁrst stage is obtained by solving the FOCs simultane-
ously for both countries. From (21), (23), and Lemma 2, we obtain
Proposition 2 Suppose that the home country exports recycled materials. If i < 2
(resp. i > 2) and RCSs are strategic substitutes (resp. complements) for the home
country in the neighborhood of the non-cooperative equilibrium, in the SPNE, the non-
cooperative RCS of the home country is stricter (resp. more lax) than the cooperative
RCS. The non-cooperative RCS of the foreign country may be more lax (resp. stricter)
than the cooperative RCS.
Thus, it may be the case that one country sets a stricter RCS and the other country
sets a more lax RCS than the cooperative RCSs. First, if i < 2, then from (10)
dπf/dµh < 0 holds, and hence, (23) implies that the home RCS in the SPNE is stricter
than the cooperative RCS. With regard to the foreign RCS, from (10) the ﬁrst term in
(21) is negative. However, if ˆ xi
j+µjdˆ xi
j/dµj > 0, the second term is positive. Thus, if the
second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one, the RHS of (21) is positive, which implies that the
foreign RCS in the SPNE is more lax than the cooperative RCS. From (18), in this case,
dEh/dµf < 0, and hence, from Lemma 2, the RCSs are strategic substitutes for the home
government. This case is illustrated in Figure 1. The thick curve (ωi
N,i = h,f) represents
the locus of the RCSs of country i when the government sets them non-cooperatively.
The dotted curve (ωi
C,i = h,f) represents the locus of the RCSs of country i when the
government sets them cooperatively. Moreover, EN and EC denote the non-cooperative
and cooperative equilibria, respectively. Second, if i > 2, then from (10), dπf/dµh > 0
follows, and hence, (23) implies that the home RCS in the SPNE is more lax than the
cooperative RCS. In this case, from (10), the ﬁrst term in (21) is positive. However, if
20ˆ xi
j+µjdˆ xi
j/dµj < 0, the second term is negative. Thus, if the second eﬀect dominates the
ﬁrst eﬀect, the RHS of (21) is negative, which implies that the foreign RCS in the SPNE
is stricter than the cooperative RCS. From (18), in this case, dEh/dµf > 0 holds, and
hence, from Lemma 2, the RCSs are strategic complements for the home government.
The asymmetry between the two countries is due to trade in recycled materials.
In particular, the demand eﬀect for recycled materials plays an important role. The
home government can reduce environmental damage in its own country in three ways:
by reducing the consumption of good X, by increasing in ﬁrm h’s demand for recycled
materials generated in the home country, and by increasing ﬁrm f’s demand for recycled
materials generated in the home country. However, since the supply constraint is binding
in the foreign country, the foreign government can only reduce environmental damage in
its own country by reducing the consumption of good X. This asymmetry in the eﬀect
of RCSs on the demand for recycled materials is important to the opposing distortions.
4.2 World Supply Constraint for Recycled Materials is Binding
In this subsection, we analyze the case in which total demand for recycled materials
exceeds the total supply of recycled materials at wR. In this case, from (5), it is clear
that environmental damage in both countries depends on the consumption of X. Thus,
governments can reduce environmental damage by reducing their own consumption.
However, it is still possible for both home and foreign non-cooperative RCSs to diverge
from cooperative RCSs in opposite directions. In this context, the terms-of-trade eﬀect
is an important factor. For simplicity, we assume that both home and foreign ﬁrms,
21which produce good X, behave as price takers in the market for recycled materials.25
In this case, since the price of recycled materials changes due to a change in each
RCS, a change in the home (resp. foreign) RCS aﬀects the supply of good X to the
foreign (resp. home) market of good X. Let ˜ x
j
i[µh,µf] denote the equilibrium outputs
in the second stage given the home and foreign RCSs. Then, the eﬀect of a change in














































where ˜ Xi = ˜ xi
i + ˜ x
j
i. Since the demand for recycled material may decrease at a certain
price of recycled materials due to an increase in the strictness of the RCS, the price of
recycled materials may fall when an RCS becomes stricter. This implies that, when µi
becomes stricter, the supply of good X to country j’s market may increase.26
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25For example, in Japan, the Japan Containers and Packaging Recycling Association administers the recycling system
of PET bottles, and holds auctions of used PET bottles. Buyers (recycling ﬁrms) make bids for those used bottles. In
this case, it is likely that buyers, and hence ﬁnal goods producers, behave as if they are price takers in the market for
recycled materials. See the association’s web site (http://www.jcpra.or.jp/) for more details.
26We are grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her helpful comment on this point. Even if both ﬁrms h and f
have bargaining power in the market for recycled materials and the price of recycled materials remains at wR, both home
and foreign ﬁrms may increase the supply of good X to the foreign market strategically when the home RCS becomes
stricter. This is because marginal revenue from supplying good X to the home market may fall substantially.
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In (25), the third term is the direct eﬀect of µi on ﬁrm j’s proﬁt, which appeared
in the analysis of the previous section. The ﬁrst term represents the eﬀects on CS,
environmental damage, and PS for producers of recycled materials in country j through
a change in the supply of good X to the market in country j. Note that µi aﬀects ˜ Xj
only through a change in wR. The second and last terms represent eﬀects that operate
through a change in wR. The second term represents the indirect eﬀect on ﬁrm j’s proﬁt.
The last term is a terms-of-trade eﬀect.
The signs of the second and third terms in (25) are the same for both countries
whether they export or import recycled materials. Although the sign of the ﬁrst term
is ambiguous, the sign of the last term in (25) clearly diﬀers between the exporting
and importing countries. When the price of recycled materials increases because RCSs
become stricter, the latter term is negative (resp. positive) for the exporting (resp.
importing) country. Thus, a terms-of-trade eﬀect provides the country that exports
(resp. imports) recycled materials with an incentive to set its RCS that is stricter (resp.
more lax) than the cooperative RCS. This is because the exporting (resp. importing)
country ignores the negative (resp. positive) eﬀect of its own RCS on the welfare of
the other country.27 Consequently, it is possible that home and foreign non-cooperative
RCSs are distorted in opposite directions.28
27When the price of recycled materials falls because RCSs become stricter, both countries have the opposite incentives.
28Since (24) for country i and (25) for country j share common terms, the comparison of them is useful. See Appendix
235 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the strategic use of recycled content standards (RCSs)
in a model of two-country reciprocal trade under international duopoly. In a simple
framework, we have demonstrated that governments have an incentive to distort RCSs
for reasons other than stimulating the domestic use of recycled materials, and that the
non-cooperative RCSs may be stricter or more lax than the globally optimal RCSs,
depending on various factors, such as the demand structure and the price diﬀerence
between virgin and recycled materials.
An interesting result in this paper is that when two countries are identical in
all respects except the recovery rates of recycled materials, the RCSs adopted non-
cooperatively by the governments of these countries may be distorted in opposite di-
rections if these countries trade not only in consumption goods but also in recycled
materials. In other words, it may be that, relative to the cooperative RCS, the export-
ing country of the recycled material chooses a stricter RCS and the importing country
chooses a more lax RCS, or vice versa. We have emphasized the importance of the
demand eﬀect for recycled materials. However, if they trade in consumption goods but
not in recycled materials, the non-cooperative RCSs are distorted in the same direction.
The results in this paper imply that the RCSs that are currently eﬀective in a number
of countries may not be globally optimal levels. In particular, our study indicates that
when the demand curve is not highly convex, countries that export recycled materials
may impose excessively strict RCSs and importing countries may impose excessively
lax RCSs. It seems that this result ﬁts the current situation. That is, as argued in
C for more details about the comparison when the inverse demand function is linear.
24the introduction, the US and Japan impose strict RCSs, including RCSs for newsprint
and green procurement requirements for various products. At the same time, the US
and Japan are large exporters of recycled materials.29 However, importers of recycled
materials, including Canada and China, impose only lax RCSs or none at all. We suggest
that the current RCSs in exporting and importing countries are distorted in opposite
directions and not globally optimal.
Under the current world system, waste management and recycling are treated as
domestic issues. Consequently, RCSs, which are intended to facilitate the utilization
of recycled materials, are not internationally coordinated. Our analysis suggests that
problems may arise under the current system. The international coordination of RCSs
will improve social welfare in countries that export or import recycled materials. How-
ever, such coordination requires that waste management and recycling are recognized as
international issues.
We have demonstrated that trade in recycled materials can alter non-cooperative
RCSs. Similar results may apply to other environmental policies. Consider, for example,
the case of regulating production-generated emissions by tradable emission permits.30
Without trade in permits, each country faces the same strategic incentive to distort
emission standards (Barrett [1]; Kennedy [13]). Thus, non-cooperative emission stan-
dards are necessarily distorted in the same direction. With trade in permits, it may be
29One may argue that the US case is inconsistent with our model, because US recovery rates are relatively low for some
materials (Table 1). Despite these low recovery rates, the US exports a large amount of recycled materials mainly because
supplies of recycled materials are high. In this sense, our results apply to the US. For example, in 2002, the US recovered
more paper and board than any other country: 47.6 million tons. Corresponding ﬁgures for other countries (millions of
tons) are: Canada, 3.4; China, 10.1; Germany, 13.7; Japan, 20.0; UK, 5.9. See the caption below Table 1 for data sources.
30We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this application.
25the case that exporting (resp. importing) countries of permits issue fewer (resp. more)
permits than the cooperative number. The main driving force is a terms-of-trade eﬀect
in permits. However, similar to the demand eﬀect for recycled materials, a demand eﬀect
for permits may also contribute to asymmetric distortion in the unusual case in which
the importing country issues less than the technologically feasible number of permits.
In that case, a change in permits in the exporting country aﬀects the terms of trade but
does not aﬀect the partner country’s import demand for permits, whereas a change in
permits in the importing country aﬀects both the terms of trade and its import demand
for permits but does not aﬀect its domestic emission level.
As already mentioned, there is no rent capture eﬀect in our model. Our model can be
extended to include such an eﬀect. The rent capture eﬀect strengthens the strategic mo-
tive to distort RCSs and hence may exacerbate the problem caused by non-cooperative
decision-making.31 For example, if shipments of recycled materials are subject to trans-
portation costs, the marginal cost of the ﬁrm producing a consumption good in the
country that imports recycled materials is higher than that in the exporting country. In
fact, since the recycled materials are relatively heavy and bulky, their transportation is
often costly. In that case, RCSs may aﬀect ﬁrms’ proﬁts diﬀerently, and thereby gener-
ate a rent capture eﬀect. Consequently, the exporting country of the recycled materials
may have an additional incentive to make its RCS higher. Our future task is to examine
this eﬀect in detail and to investigate which eﬀects are more important in practice.
31Using data on RCSs and garbage collection programs, Jacque [11] suggested that US recycled content newsprint
regulations are a trade barrier.
26Appendix
A Possible Combinations of Home and Foreign RCSs
In this Appendix, we examine possible combinations of µh and µf. The relationship
between the demand for and supply of recycled materials at time t is:
λh ˘ Xh,t−1[wR,t−1;µh,µf]+λf ˘ Xf,t−1[wR,t−1;µh,µf] ≥ µh ˘ Xh,t[wR,t;µh,µf]+µf ˘ Xf,t[wR,t;µh,µf],
(A.1)
where ˘ Xi,t[wR,t;µi,µj] denotes ˆ Xi,t[wR,t;µi] or ˜ Xi,t[wR,t;µi,µj]. In the steady state,
wR,t−1 = wR,t = wR and, accordingly, ˘ Xi,t−1 = ˘ Xi,t = ˘ Xi. In what follows, we divide the
possible combinations of home and foreign RCSs into three cases.
First, any combination of µh and µf is possible when total world supply exceeds total
world demand if wR = cR. Since the price of the recycled materials depends on neither
µh nor µf, when
(λh − µh) ˆ Xh[µh] = −(λf − µf) ˆ Xf[µf], (A.2)
total world demand is exactly equal to total world supply at wR. It is clear that this
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Two results relating to the sign of (A.3) can be obtained. First, if both λh = µh and
λf = µf, the slope is negative. Second, if the demand for recycled materials increases
as an RCS becomes stricter (that is, if ˆ Xi + µid ˆ Xi/dµi > 0 holds for all µi), the slope
is also negative. In Figure A.1, the horizontal (resp. vertical) axis represents the home
(resp. foreign) RCS, and the thick curve, CGHK, represents equality (A.2) when ˆ Xi +
27µid ˆ Xi/dµi > 0. If λh − µh = −(λf − µf) and µh = µf, the equality (A.2) holds, since
µh = µf implies ˆ Xh = ˆ Xf. Thus, the curve goes through both H and G, where µh = µf
on the line labeled α and λh − µh = −(λf − µf) on the line labeled β. Moreover, from
(A.3), since µh = λh and µf = λf implies µh > µf, dµh/dµf < −1 at H. Moreover,
dµh/dµf > −1 at G, since λf − µf < 0 and λh − µh > 0 at G.
Consequently, in the area ACKMO, the total supply of recycled materials exceeds
total demand for recycled materials at wR. Therefore, any combinations of RCSs are
possible, and the supply constraint is not binding.
Second, we focus on the area 2DEIH in Figure A.1. Since this area is located in the
upper-right of the curve CGHK, if wR,t−1 = wR,t = wR, demand for recycled materials
exceeds supply of recycled materials. Thus, the price of the recycled materials is likely to
increase. However, since µh > λh and µf > λf, if wR,t−1 = wR,t, demand exceeds supply
whatever the price of the recycled materials. This implies that there is no steady-state
equilibrium, which implies that there are no feasible combinations of RCSs.
Third, combinations of home and foreign RCSs may be possible in the areas CDH
and HIK, since the gap between demand and supply may be adjusted by a change in the
price of the recycled materials. However, within those areas, some combinations must
be eliminated because they are not feasible.
First, in the area 4FGH, since µh > µf, the marginal cost of supplying good X to
the home market is greater than that of supplying to the foreign market. Therefore,
˜ Xf > ˜ Xh. Moreover, since −(λf − µf) > λh − µh, it follows that
−(λf − µf) ˜ Xf > (λh − µh) ˜ Xh. (A.4)
28Equation (A.4) implies that total demand for recycled materials exceeds the total supply
of recycled materials whatever the price of the recycled materials provided ﬁrms supply
good X to both the home and foreign markets. Moreover, the lowest price of the recycled
materials, at which the supply of good X to the home market is zero, is lower than the
price at which the supply of good X to the foreign market is zero. Therefore, in this
area, there is no steady-state equilibrium.
Moreover, in equilibrium, the market for recycled materials should be stable in
terms of the price adjustment mechanism, given both µh and µf. Given (A.1) and
d ˜ Xi,t/dwR,t = −µi/P 0
i(3 − i), the condition for the slope of the inverse supply curve to










, if λh >
<
µh and λf <
>
µf. (A.5)
Thus, any area not satisfying this condition must be eliminated from consideration.
For example, consider a linear demand curve (i = 0). For any given µh and µf,
P 0
h = P 0
f. In the area CDFG, µf > µh and −(λf −µf) > λh −µh. Moreover, in the area
HIK, µh > µf and −(λf − µf) > λh − µh hold. Thus, (A.5) is satisﬁed in these areas.
However, in the shaded area, since µh > µf and −(λf −µf) < λh−µh, (A.5) is not met.
B Trade in Recycled Materials
In this Appendix, focusing on the steady state, we determine the areas in which trade
in recycled materials takes place.
First, we examine the case in which the total world supply constraint is not binding
when wR = cR; this is so in area ACKMO in Figure A.1. We mainly focus on the case





h + µfˆ xh
f, the home country imports recycled materials. If
λh ˆ Xh = λf ˆ Xf, (B.1)
the supply of recycled materials is the same in the two markets, and trade in recycled











The dotted curve represents (B.1) for λh > λf. The supply of recycled materials in the
home (resp. foreign) market exceeds that in the foreign (resp. home) market in the area
above and to the left (resp. below and to the right) of the dotted curve in Figure A.1.32
In the model as it stands, it is important to note that the ﬁrm h’s demand for recycled
materials equals the ﬁrm f’s demand. Thus, if there is trade in recycled materials, the
home country exports (resp. imports) recycled materials in the area above and to the
left (resp. below and to the right) of the dotted curve in Figure A.1.
Suppose that λh(ˆ xh
h + ˆ x
f
h) = µhˆ xh
h + µfˆ xh












dµh − ˆ xh
h
. (B.3)
We focus on the case where demand for recycled materials increases as an RCS becomes
stricter. To make the comparison clear, using ˆ Xi = 2ˆ x
j















dµh − ˆ xh
h
. (A.3)0
In this case, the numerator of (B.3) is positive and the denominator of (B.3) is negative.
Thus, the sign of (B.3) is negative. Moreover, at J in Figure A.1, the numerator of
32If λh = λf, (b.1) is the same as the line labeled α.
30(B.3) is smaller than that of (A.3)’ and the absolute value of the denominator of (B.3)
is greater than that of (A.3)’. Thus, the absolute value of the slope of the curve on
which total world supply equals total world demand (the curve CGHK in Figure A.1) is
greater than the absolute value of the slope of the curve on which home supply equals
home demand (the curve JL in Figure A.1) at J in Figure A.1.
The condition for the case in which the foreign country imports recycled materials is
obtained analogously. Figure A.1 provides an example. JKL (resp. BCJ) represents the
area in which the home country imports (resp. exports) recycled materials.
Now, consider the case in which the world supply constraint for recycled materials is















This is not necessarily positive.
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This implies that the denominator and the numerator of (B.4) cannot simultaneously be
zero. Thus, there is no two-dimensional area that corresponds to the absence of trade
31in recycled materials in CDFG, HIK, and the shaded area in Figure A.1. In general,
trade in recycled materials takes place when the world supply constraint for recycled
materials is binding.
Two important points should be noted. First, the larger the diﬀerence in the recovery
rates of both countries, the more likely is trade in recycled materials to take place. In
particular, the country with the highest (resp. lowest) recovery rate is likely to export
(resp. import) recycled materials. For example, suppose that λh = 1 and λf = 0. Unless
µh = µf = 0, trade in recycled materials takes place.
Second, the greater is the environmental damage from one unit of waste, the more
likely is trade in recycled materials. RCSs become stricter as environmental damage
worsens, which implies that demand for recycled materials increases. Thus, it is likely
that the supply constraint binds in at least one country.
C Terms-of-Trade Eﬀect
In this Appendix, focusing on the terms-of-trade eﬀect, we discuss the direction of dis-
tortion. We assume that the inverse demand curve is linear (Pi = A − aXi,i = 0) in





2(λh − µh)(wR − wV) + 3a ˜ Xh





2(λf − µf)(wR − wV) + 3a ˜ Xf
−2(λh − µh)µh − 2(λf − µf)µf
> 0, (C.2)
where we have used equality between total world supply and demand in equilibrium
(λh ˜ Xh+λf ˜ Xf = µh ˜ Xh+µf ˜ Xf). Note that the denominator of both equations is positive
32from the stability condition. As discussed in Appendix A, possible combinations of home
and foreign RCSs are represented either by the area CDFG (µh < µf,λh > µh,λf < µf)
or by the area HIK (µh > µf,λh < µh,λf > µf) in Figure A.1.
First, consider the exporting (home) country. Since i = 0, all of the four terms
in (25) for the home country (∂W/∂µh) and (24) for the foreign country (∂W f/∂µf)
are the same except for multipliers (d ˜ Xk/dµk,xk
l ,dwR/dµk,k,l = i,j). Moreover, since
∂W f/∂µf = 0 at the non-cooperative equilibrium, it is useful to compare them with
each other to determine the direction of the distortion of µh. In (24) for the foreign
(importing) country, since the second term is positive and the third and fourth terms are
negative, the magnitude of the terms-of-trade eﬀect is one of the factors that determines
the sign of the ﬁrst term. If the volume of trade in recycled materials is large, the ﬁrst











































if µh < µf.
If µh > µf, the third term is magniﬁed to the greatest degree and the ﬁrst term is
magniﬁed to the least degree in (25). The negative terms are magniﬁed to a greater
degree than the positive terms in the latter case. Thus, ∂W/∂µh evaluated at the non-
cooperative equilibrium is negative, which implies that the home government ignores the
negative eﬀect of its own non-cooperative action on the welfare of the foreign country.
Therefore, the non-cooperative home RCS is stricter than the cooperative RCS. By
contrast, if µh < µf, relative to the FOC for the foreign country, the second and fourth
terms are magniﬁed to a greater degree than the other two terms, and the third term is
33magniﬁed to a lesser degree in (25). However, if trade in recycled materials is suﬃciently
high, the result is the same as that in the case of µh > µf.
Second, consider the importing (foreign) country. Similar to the case of the exporting
country, it is useful to compare (24) for the home country with (25) for the foreign
country. In (24) for the home country, since the second and fourth terms are positive
and the third term is negative, if the volume of trade in recycled materials is large, the


































, if µh < µf.
If µh > µf, the second and fourth terms are magniﬁed to a greater degree and the third
term is magniﬁed to the least degree in (25). The positive terms are magniﬁed to a
greater degree than the negative terms in the latter case. Thus, ∂W/∂µf evaluated at
the non-cooperative equilibrium is positive, which implies that the foreign government
ignores the positive eﬀect of its own non-cooperative action on the welfare of the home
country. Therefore, the non-cooperative foreign RCS is more lax than the cooperative
RCS. By contrast, if µh < µf, relative to the FOC for the home country, the third term is
magniﬁed to a greater degree than the other three terms, and the ﬁrst term is magniﬁed
to a lesser degree in (25). However, if trade in recycled materials is suﬃciently high, the
result is the same as that in the case of µh > µf.
Although there are other factors that distort the two RCSs in opposite directions, it
is clear that the terms-of-trade eﬀect is an important factor. This eﬀect makes the RCS
of the country that exports (resp. imports) recycled materials stricter (resp. more lax).
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37Table 1: Recovery Rates of Aluminum Beverage Can and Paper in Selected Countries in 2002
(%)
Canada China France Germany Italy Japan Spain Sweden UK US
Aluminum N/A N/A 30 78 50 83 25 86 42 53
Can
Paper and 44 24 50 72 45 65 52 69 48 48
Board
Source: (i) Aluminum: (European countries) European Aluminium Association, (Japan and the US)
Aluminum Can Recycling Association of Japan; (ii) Paper: (Canada) Paper Recycling Association of
Canada, (China) Japan Pulp and Paper Company Ltd., (European countries) Confederation of
European Paper Industries, (Japan) Paper Recycling Promotion Center, (US) AF&PA.
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 Technical Appendix: On Second Order Con-
ditions
In this report, focusing on the case of wR = cR, we derive some conditions for second
order conditions (SOCs) to be satisﬁed in a special case in which the elasticity of the
slope of the inverse demand function is constant and equal to or greater than zero, that
is,  ≥ 0.





i/dµi is not an important factor for SOCs to be satisﬁed, although the diﬀerence in
material prices and the marginal environmental damage are important factors. In the
following, we examine the case in the absence of trade in recycled materials ﬁrst and,
next, we examine the case in the presence of trade in recycled materials.
1. The case in the absence of trade in recycled materials
1.1 Non-cooperative behavior
Let us begin with the case in which no trade in recycled materials occurs and governments























































































































Substituting (5) and (6) into (4), and using the fact that dˆ xh




h/dµh + dˆ x
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h(2 − µh)(wR − wV)


























The second term (line) of (8) is negative. Moreover, since  ≥ 0 from the assumption,
the second term in the braces of the ﬁrst line is positive. Thus, the suﬃcient condition
2for (1) to be satisﬁed is
−




h ≥ 0. (9)
Since we have assumed that both countries are symmetrical except for the recovery rates,
the similar condition is obtained for (2) to be satisﬁed:
−




f ≥ 0. (10)
One point should be noted. From (13 (in the text)), for an interior solution to be
obtained, the following inequality must be satisﬁed at least for a certain range of µi:
−




i < 0. (11)
Thus, conditions should be rewritten as follows:





(6 − )(wR − wV)
3 − 
. (12)













































































































and (12) holds for both countries, (3) is satisﬁed. From (11 in the text), if ˆ xi
j +
µjdˆ xi
j/dµj ≥ 0 holds, the condition (14) necessarily holds. Even if ˆ xi
j + µjdˆ xi
j/dµj < 0,
if the absolute value is not so large, the condition holds.
31.2 Cooperative behavior
Now let us turn to the case in which no trade in recycled materials occurs and govern-














































(2 − )(wR − wV)
3 − 
























































































































































































































h(2 − µh)(wR − wV)




























































































































































































































































































necessarily holds. Thus, from (21) and (22), the suﬃcient condition for the SOCs ((15),
(16), and (17)) to be satisﬁed is:
−




i(2 − µi)(wR − wV)











The second term is necessarily positive, thus the combination of the following two con-
ditions can be a suﬃcient condition for SOCs to hold:
−




i ≥ 0 (25)
µi(wR − wV)
ˆ XiP 0(3 − )
< 1. (26)
Two points should be noted. First, similar to the case of non-cooperative behavior, the
following inequality must be satisﬁed at least for a certain range of µi:
−




i < 0. (27)
Thus, (25) should be rewritten as follows:





2(4 − )(wR − wV)
3 − 
. (28)




i/dµi > 0, from (9 in the text), −(wR −wV)/( ˆ XiP 0(3−)) < 1/2
holds. Thus, if  < 2, (26) necessarily holds. On the other hand, if ˆ x
j
i + µidˆ x
j
i/dµi < 0,
−(wR−wV)/( ˆ XiP 0(3−)) > 1/2. Thus, if  > 2, inequality (26) does not hold. However,
since the second term in (24) is positive, it is possible that inequality (24) holds.





































, if 2 <  < 3. (29)
Therefore, a certain range of µi can exist.
2. The case in the presence of trade in recycled materials
2.1 Non-cooperative behavior
Now let us turn to the case in which recycled materials are traded internationally. We

























































































































































h(1 − µh)(wR − wV)





























































































































































































8Consequently, we obtain the suﬃcient conditions for the SOCs to be satisﬁed:
−










P 0 ˆ Xf
)
> 6. (39)
One point should be noted. Similar to the case in which no trade in recycled materials
exists, from the FOCs, for an interior solution to be obtained, the following inequality
must be satisﬁed at least for a certain range of µi:
−




i < 0. (40)
Thus, conditions should be rewritten as follows:









Now let us turn to the case in which governments act cooperatively. The SOCs for this
































































































































































h(1 − µh)(wR − wV)



































































































































f − ˆ x
f




























f(1 − λf) − E0
h(µf − λf))(wR − wV)
































f − ˆ x
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Thus, from (42), (43), (44), (47), (49), and (50), the following combination of conditions
is a suﬃcient condition for the SOCs to be satisﬁed:
−




h > 0,and (51)
E
0
f(1 − λf) − E
0
h(µf − λf) > 0. (52)
Two points should be noted. The ﬁrst point is about (51). Similar to the case of
non-cooperative behavior, the following inequality must be satisﬁed at least for a certain
range of µi:
−




i < 0. (53)
Thus, (51) should be rewritten as follows:





(4 − )(wR − wV)
3 − 
. (54)
The second point is about (52). It is clear that 1 − λf > µf − λf. Moreover, since
we consider the case in which the foreign recovery rate is small, it is likely that the
11environmental damage in the foreign country is more serious than that in the home
country unless µh = µf = 0.Thus, it is likely that (52) holds.





































, if 2 <  < 3. (55)
Therefore, a certain range of µi can exist.
3. Discussion
In the case in the absence of trade in recycled materials, the sign of ˆ x
j
i + µidˆ x
j
i/dµi





i/dµi is not so large, the SOCs are satisﬁed and, from (24), the fact that  > 2
does not preclude those conditions from holding. Moreover, in the case in the presence




i/dµi does not matter. In both cases,
the diﬀerence in material prices and the marginal environmental damage are important
factors. In some cases, market scale Xi matters. It should be concluded, from what has
been discussed above, that it is reasonable to assume the SOCs to be satisﬁed in each
case.
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